This article is written by Arya Senapati. It deals with the landmark case of Prakash vs. Phulavati (2015). It attempts to analyze the case through its factual matrix, legal issues, contentions, and judgment. It also covers important provisions and legal principles concerning women’s rights as coparceners under Hindu personal law.
Article 14 and Article 15 of the Indian Constitution guarantee gender equality to women and provide them with the fundamental right against discrimination of any kind. One of the areas where women faced the most amount of discrimination was inheritance or claim over Hindu joint family property. Traditionally, the inheritance of the property of a Hindu Joint Family was governed by the Mitakshara system. As per the old understanding of the Mitakshara system, women were not considered coparceners and had no claim over the property of a Hindu joint family forming a coparcenary. They were entitled to stridhan, and the concept of dowry emerged because women did not have access to property. The concept of dowry led to many problems and severe cases of dowry deaths for women. They did not have economic freedom of independence due to this lack of entitlement over inherited property. Owing to all these factors, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which replaced Section 6 of the Act. The amended provision provided equal coparcenary rights to women, the same as their male counterparts, and they attained full claim over the joint family property. Even though this piece of legislation was highly progressive, its interpretation raised multiple questions. The primary question being regarding the retrospective application of the amended provision. This led to a series of decisions, one of which was the case of Prakash vs. Phulavati (2015), which held that the amended provision could not be retrospectively applied, and the father and the daughter both need to be alive at the date of amendment for the provision to be applicable in the case. This idea was overruled much later recently by the landmark case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma (2020). Following the route was Arunachala Gounder vs. Ponnuswamy (2022), in which the Supreme Court held that the self-acquired property of a Hindu male dying intestate would devolve by inheritance and not succession, and a daughter will be entitled to inherit such property as well as the coparcenary property, the condition of rights of women in terms of the property has been crystallized in a good direction.
- Appellant: Prakash
- Respondent: Phulavati
- Court: Supreme Court of India
- Citation: AIR 2016 SC 769
- Bench: J. Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. Anil R. Dave
- Date: 16.10.2015
- Provisions involved: Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
- Overruled by: Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma (2020)
The respondent in this case, who was originally the plaintiff, had filed a case before the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Belgaum for the purpose of partition and separate possession of her share in the property, which she ascertained as 1/7th. The claim was made on properties scheduled A to G except for a particular property mentioned in Schedule A, numbered as CTS No. 3241, in which she claimed 1/28th share. As per the plaintiff, the suit properties consisted of properties that were acquired by her father, the late Yeshwant Upadhye through inheritance from his adoptive mother Smt. Sunanda Bai. According to her plea, due to her father’s death, the shares should devolve to her as per her claims.
The claim of the plaintiff-respondent was challenged on the ground that she could only get shares in her deceased father’s self-acquired property and a few other properties but not on his entire property. While the suit was pending, the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into effect and substituted Section 6 of the original Hindu Succession Act, 1956, stating that women would have the same coparcenary rights to the coparcenary property as do men. They shall attain coparceny by birth just like their male counterparts and will also be subject to equal liabilities with their male counterparts.
Owing to this amendment being passed and the changes in circumstances that it foresaw, the plaintiff-respondent amended her plaint and claimed her equal shares as per the newly amended law. The Trial Court, in its decree, granted 1/28th share to her in certain properties based on the notional partition created on the death of her father, and in certain properties, no share was given to her. In some properties, 1/7th share was also granted.
High Court’s decision
The respondent plaintiff, aggrieved by the decision of the Trial Court, sought an appeal to the Karnataka High Court, with the ground that as per the amendment, she is an equal coparcener to her father’s property and must receive her shares based on the newly amended law. She claimed that she was entitled to inherit equal shares in the coparcenary property like her brothers other than the individual claims in certain items of property.
The defendant-appellants contended that the plaintiff could not be made entitled to any share in the self-acquired property of the members of the joint family. They also contended that the claim to shares made by the plaintiff must be decided as per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as it was priorly construed and not through the amended version of it.
The defendant relied on the case of M. Prithviraj vs. Leelamma N (2007) and contended that if the father of the plaintiff died prior to the commencement of the amendment, the amended provisions would not apply to ascertain her shares in the property. Only the law which was applicable on the date of opening of succession will be applied while ascertaining the plaintiff’s share.
The High Court framed the issues in this case as: “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to shares in her father’s property as per the previous provision or the amended provision of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?”
The High Court held that, even if the suits or proceedings were pending during the commencement of the amendment, the amended provisions would still apply. The law in this scenario is well established as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Sekar vs. Geetha and Ors. (2009), which held that any changes in the law apply to pending proceedings, and such an application would not be treated as a retrospective application of law but simply the law as it stands on the day when made applicable.
The High Court stated that even if the case was instituted in the year of 1992, almost four years after the death of the father, the position of the parties still remained as members of the joint family. Therefore, as per the amended version of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a female member of a joint family becomes entitled to coparcenary property as she is deemed to be a coparcener by birth and has a right to the joint family property through birth. Female members also become equal sharers of the property as their male counterparts. Whenever a partition takes place, the coparceners will succeed in the property equally. This legal position was envisioned by Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Sekar vs. Geetha and Ors. cannot be ignored and must be applied strictly to establish that female members are equal coparceners. The only exception to this principle and to the application of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is the situation where partition had been effectuated by a registered partition deed or by a decree of the court which had attained finality before 20.12.2004.
Considering that the instant case doesn’t fall under such an exception, it is fair to say that the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to 1/7th share in all items of properties in Schedule A to D, and as per Schedule F, the first item was given up by the plaintiff.
Aggrieved by this decision, the defendant-appellants filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.Â
- Whether the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, relevant even after the death of the respondent’s father?
- Whether the provisions of the amended legislation have a retrospective application?
The appellants argued that the respondent could only claim shares in the property as per the unamended provision of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They claim that the provision, as amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 200
