This insightful article is crafted by Satyanshu Kumari. The narrative delves into the realms of admission and confession under the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, where both hold significant weight as exceptions. The article gracefully decodes the intricacies of different forms of confessions outlined in Sections 24 to 30 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872.
The landmark case of Sahoo vs. State of U.P. (1965) highlights the admissibility of a confession in criminal legal scenarios. This legal battle falls within the purview of criminal and evidence law, specifically deciphering and implementing Sections 24 to 30 of the Indian Evidence Act (1872) (referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’). The central focus is on whether a self-incriminating statement uttered by the accused can qualify as a confession, and if such a confession necessitates communication with another party to be admissible in a court of law.
Admissions and confessions both serve as exceptions to the hearsay rule of the Indian Evidence Act. Notably, the probative value of an admission and confession is independent of each other’s conduct. However, like any other evidence piece, validation is essential to consider them as proof. This validation can only be manifest through witnesses who have heard the admission or confession, as per the specific scenario. In this narrative, we embark on understanding admission and confession, pivotal exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence.
- Case Name- Sahoo vs. State of U.P. 1966 AIR 40
- Equivalent Citations– 1966 AIR 40
- Case Number: 248 of 1964
- Acts involved: The Indian Penal Code, of 1860 (referred to as “IPC”) and the Indian Evidence Act, of 1872.
- Relevant statutes and provisions: Section 302 of IPC and Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act.
- Name of the Court– The Supreme Code of India
- Bench– Subbarao. K, J.C. Shah and R.S. Bachawat
- Petitioners– Sahoo
- Respondents– State of U.P.
- Judgement Date– 16th February 1965
- Sahoo, the appellant in the said case, is a resident of Pachperwa in the district of Gonda. He has two sons, Badri and Kirpa Shankar. He lost his wife years ago. His eldest son, Badri, married one Sunderpatti. Badri had taken up employment in Lucknow and hence his wife lived with his father, the appellant. It was commonly believed that Sunderpatti and Sahoo shared an illicit relationship which was close.
- Nevertheless, numerous altercations occurred between them, and on August 12, 1963, Sunderpatti fled during one such quarrel to the residence of a neighbour, Muhammad Abdullah.
- Post a quarrel, the appellant brought her back and following a spat, they both slept in the same room of the house. The appellant’s second son, Kripa Shankar, an 8-year-old boy, was the lone inhabitant of the house.
- The next morning, Suderpatti was found severely injured, subsequently rushed to the hospital, but succumbed soon after.
- On the same morning, the appellant was overheard muttering about finishing Suderpatti to put an end to daily arguments. Sahoo was taken to court on a charge under Section 302 of the IPC (Section 101 of Bharatiya Naya Sanhita, 2023, hereafter referred to as “BNS, 2023).
- Is an accused’s soliloquy tantamount to a confession as per the Indian Evidence Act, and if so, is it valid evidence under Section 17 of the Evidence Act?
- Is communication with another individual necessary for an extrajudicial confession under Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act?
- What is the probative value of a confessional soliloquy?
- Does evaluating circumstantial evidence alongside the confession establish the accused’s guilt?
Petitioners
The petitioner argued that mere muttering cannot constitute a confession and posited that a confession necessitates communication with a third party. Additionally, it was contended that the circumstantial evidence presented was inadequate to establish the accused’s guilt, given the absence of direct evidence.
The petitioner raised issues regarding the concept of confession in this particular case and challenged the validity of a self-incriminating statement made by the accused. The admissibility and reliability of the confession as primary evidence were questioned, emphasizing the need for corroborative evidence to substantiate its veracity.
Respondent
The respondent contended that a valid confession does not mandatorily require communication with the authorities and argued that mere muttering was sufficient. Furthermore, they presented a series of circumstantial evidence indicating the accused’s culpability. The incident of Sunderpatti seeking refuge with a neighbor underscored the animosity between the appellant and the deceased. Additionally, Kripa Shanker witnessed the appellant leaving the house muttering to himself.
The respondents maintained that the confession made by the accused was admissible and constituted substantive evidence. They advocated that the confession, coupled with other evidence introduced, was adequate to prove the appellant’s guilt and support conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.
The legal statutes implicated in this case are Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 24 to Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act.
‘Confession’ under the Indian Evidence Act
The term ‘confession’ remains undefined within the Evidence Act. Confession is elucidated from Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. It is also stated in Sections 164, 281, and 463 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A confession is an admission or acknowledgment of the offense by the accused.
Forms of confession
- Judicial confession
Judicial confessions are those made in the presence of a magistrate or in the court as directed by the law. The probative value of judicial confessions is governed by Section 80 of the Evidence Act, prescribing that if a confession is made in the presence of a magistrate or court and recorded rightly during legal proceedings, it shall be presumed truthful.
Section 164 of the Code enables the magistrate to document the accused’s confession, claiming the exclusive judicial function domain for confession documentation without executive authority.
- Extra-judicial confession
An extra-judicial confession occurs outside the magistrate or court’s presence, deemed less weighty evidence. When made conversing with someone other than a magistrate, an unfettered confessional guilt admission is labelled extra-judicial confession over court-mediated guilty plea.
Relevancy of confession under the Evidence Act
Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act scrutinize the confession’s relevance.
Section 24: Confession by inducement, threat, or promise
Section 24 deems confessions irrelevant if made due to inducement or coercion, especially to those in authority where the accused might understandably anticipate benefits or alleviating temporal adversities. Involuntarily acquired confessions are dismissed.
- E.D. Smith vs. Emperor (8th November 1917)
In this case, Mr E.D. Smith was convicted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate for dishonest possession of stolen items under Section 411 of the IPC. Confidential statements made during the search of the accused’s shop formed the crux of the conviction. Confessions affirming guilt, obtained via Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, were deemed inadmissible. In particular, the court considered the statements inadmissible before further deliberation.
Section 25: Confession made to the police officer not to be proved
Section 25 safeguards against proving confessions made to the police officer against the accused. This provision protects accused rights, ensuring confessions extracted in police custody under duress or coercion remain inadmissible.
- Pakala Narayana Swami vs. King Emperor (1939)
In Pakala Narayana Swami v King Emperor, the Privy Council ruled out admissibility of pre-arrest police-obtained statements following the amendment of Section 162 by the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1923. The case underscored the distinction between confession and innocence explanation, dismissing the admissibility of the accused’s statement.
Although dismissed, the accused’s statement signaled the deceased’s presence, aiding in achieving justice.
Section 26: Confession by the accused while in police custody not to be proven against him
Section 26 bars confession use from police custody unless made in a magistrate’s direct presence. This section excludes village heads engaged in magisterial duties from the ‘magistrate’ definition, besides limiting confession admissibility to in-person magisterial presence.
- Ram Narayan Singh vs. State of Bihar (2000)
In this case, the Supreme Court deemed the accused’s confession inadmissible, being obtained under promise of leniency, breaching Section 26. The promise suggested reasonable advantage for confessing, hence deeming the confession inadmissible.
Section 27: How much information received from the accused may be proved
Section 27 stands as an exception, allowing proof from accused-custody confessions aiding fact discovery. This section permits using such confessions leading to relevant information discovery, even if not confessions, for evidentiary purposes.
In the Mohan Lal vs. Ajit Singh (1978) case,
